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Abstract 
This chapter outlines a metaphysics of science in the sense of a naturalized metaphysics. It 
considers in the first place the interplay of physics and metaphysics in Newtonian mechanics, 
then goes into the issues for the metaphysics of time that relativity physics raises, shows that 
what one considers as the referent of quantum theory depends on metaphysical considerations 
and finally explains how the stance that one takes with respect to objective modality and laws of 
nature shapes the options that are available for an ontology of quantum physics. In that way, this 
chapter seeks to make a case for a natural philosophy that treats physics and metaphysics as 
inseparable in the enquiry into the constitution of the world, there being neither a neo-positivist 
way of deducing metaphysics from the formalisms of physical theories, nor a neo-rationalist 
realm of investigation for metaphysics that is independent of physics. 
1. What is metaphysics of science? 
Metaphysics of science is a metaphysics because it puts forward ontological claims (that is, 
claims about what there is in the world) by basing itself on science – instead of conceptual 
analysis, common sense, or intuitions. By “metaphysics”, one does in this context not mean a 
theory that claims to refer to a domain of being beyond the empirical realm, but, in the 
Aristotelian sense, a theory that seeks to achieve a general and fundamental understanding of 
the empirical world itself (see Aristotle, Metaphysics, book 4). Today’s metaphysics of 
science is considered as being part and parcel of analytic philosophy broadly conceived, 
which, since its metaphysical turn, no longer focuses on the analysis of language. It is instead 
a systematic and argumentative enterprise that seeks to achieve a comprehensive view of the 
world and our place in it – in short, pursuing what philosophy has been since its beginnings in 
Plato and Aristotle. The trait that distinguishes metaphysics of science from standard analytic 
philosophy is its being anchored in science: one bases oneself on science in doing 
metaphysics. It is therefore common today to use the term naturalized metaphysics. 
Indeed, standard analytic metaphysics seeks to find out truth about the constitution of the 
world mainly based on conceptual analysis linked with common sense realism and intuitions. 
This enterprise is not hostile to science: a global supervenience thesis to the effect that 
everything that there is in the world supervenes on a basis that is investigated by fundamental 
physics is common ground. But standard analytic metaphysics does not show any particular 
interest in research about what this basis may be like given our current fundamental physical 
theories. Jackson’s (1998) plea for conceptual analysis is a good illustration of this situation. 
Naturalized metaphysics is opposed to the methodology employed by this type of 
metaphysics. The term “naturalized metaphysics” characterizes not so much the ontological 
 Metaphysics of science as naturalized metaphysics  2
stance of naturalism – a stance shared by most adherents to conceptual analysis –, but the 
method that seeks to find out truth about the constitution of the world by means of a close 
examination of our current fundamental physical theories. In particular, any metaphysical 
claim is to be motivated and justified by the content of our best scientific theories – by 
contrast to conceptual analysis, common sense, or intuitions. The book by Ladyman and Ross 
(2007) is the most forceful articulation of this type of metaphysics.1 
This opposition in methodology does not necessarily lead to an opposition in the content of 
the metaphysics thus obtained, given in particular the nearly universal acceptance of the 
mentioned global supervenience thesis. However, naturalized metaphysics often comes with a 
good deal of polemic against analytic metaphysics: it is suggested that the best candidate for 
truth about the constitution of the world that we can currently achieve can be read from our 
fundamental physical theories and that what thus can be extracted from physics contradicts 
much of what is commonly accepted in standard metaphysics. 
This chapter investigates how metaphysics of science qua naturalized metaphysics can 
work when taking fundamental physics as a guideline. To start with, I will consider the 
ontology of Newtonian mechanics (section 2), followed by an enquiry into the special theory 
of relativity and its alleged philosophical consequences for the metaphysics of time (section 
3). I will then go into the options for an ontology of quantum physics (section 4) and examine 
how these options depend on the stance that one takes with respect to laws of nature and 
modality (section 5). By contrast to what Ladyman and Ross (2007) suggest, it will become 
increasingly clear during this investigation that there is no one-way road from physics to 
metaphysics, but that any ontology of physics has to bring in both the physical theory in 
question and considerations from standard metaphysics.2 In a nutshell, there neither is a neo-
positivist way of deducing metaphysics from physics, nor a neo-rationalist realm of 
investigation for metaphysics that is independent of physics. What we need is a metaphysics 
of science or a naturalized metaphysics that is a natural philosophy as practised in the 17th and 
18th century, when physics and metaphysics were treated as forming a seamless whole. 
2. Newton’s natural philosophy 
Classical mechanics proposes an ontology of matter in motion: the fundamental physical 
domain consists in moving particles, with the laws of nature accounting for the way in which 
the particles move.3 Thus, Newton famously writes at the end of the “Opticks” (1704): 
… it seems probable to me, that God in the Beginning form’d Matter in solid, massy, hard, 
impenetrable, moveable Particles … the Changes of corporeal Things are to be placed only in 
the various Separations and new Associations and motions of these permanent Particles. 
(Question 31, p. 400 in the edition Newton 1952) 
Newton’s natural philosophy (philosophia naturalis) can be considered as seeking to reply to 
three questions. The first is this one: What are the physical objects? Newton’s answer is that 
matter consists in particles that are distributed in a background space, a particle being a 
                                                
1 See furthermore the papers in Ross, Ladyman and Kincaid (2013) for discussion as well as Ney (2012). 
2 See also the balanced positions of Callender (2011) as well as Chakravartty (2013), who examines to what 
extent naturalized metaphysics has to go into the topics of standard metaphysics that are usually considered 
as being far from science. On the other end of the spectrum, see Monton (2011), whose argumentation, 
however, is based on the claim that our current fundamental physical theories are false. 
3 See Maudlin (2012, chs. 1-2) for an excellent recent examination. 
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material object that is so small that it is localized at a point in space, thus being indivisible. 
Hence, some points of space are occupied – a particle is localized at them –, whereas others 
are empty. 
If one adopts a sparse view of physical properties, there is no reason to make use of the 
notion of properties as far as this basic characterization of matter is concerned. Matter is 
primitive stuff, and it is a primitive fact that some points of space are occupied whereas others 
are not. There is a good reason for conceiving matter in terms of particles, that is, in terms of 
points of space being occupied or empty. If one considered matter to be a continuous stuff 
distributed all over space (that is, gunk), then one would have to maintain that there is more 
stuff at some points of space and less stuff at others in order to be able to accommodate 
variation. But it could not be a primitive fact that there is more stuff at some points of space 
and less at others; a property of the stuff would be needed to account for that difference. 
However, as we will see shortly, all the properties that classical mechanics attributes to matter 
concern its temporal development, not simply the fact that there is matter. The view of matter 
consisting in particles can easily take into account the fact that there is more matter in some 
regions of space than in others: in some regions of space, more points are occupied than in 
others. 
In Newtonian mechanics, the distribution of matter in a background space develops in a 
background time. That is to say, as time passes, there is change in which points of space are 
occupied and which are empty. That change is such that the particles persist in the sense of 
enduring, each moving on a continuous trajectory. An alternative view would be to admit just 
single events, with no continuous sequences of events. But, again, taking matter to have a 
continuous existence – instead of events popping in a discontinuous way in and out of 
existence as time passes – seems to be the simpler view. Consequently, each particle has an 
identity in time by which it distinguishes itself from all the other particles. The particles can 
therefore with good reason be regarded as substances. 
The fact that there is change implies that Newton has to answer a second question: What 
are the laws of the temporal development of the physical objects? More precisely: What are 
the properties of the physical objects so that certain laws describe their behaviour? 
Consequently, the need for a commitment to properties arises in Newton’s philosophia 
naturalis when it comes to an account of the temporal development of the physical objects. 
Change in position as time passes means that the particles have the property of velocity, 
which is the first temporal derivative of position. That is to say, over and above having an 
initial position, the particles have an initial velocity, and this initial velocity makes them 
move in a certain manner. The property of velocity of each particle is conserved, as long as it 
is the only property that is taken into consideration. Velocity thereby gives rises to Newton’s 
first law, which says that given an initial velocity, particles move on a straight line with 
constant velocity (inertial motion). 
However, it is an empirical fact that there is not only change in the points in space that 
particles occupy as time passes, but also change in their state of motion, that is, change in 
velocity. That is why it is necessary to attribute more properties to the particles than just an 
initial velocity. Newton does so in taking the particles to be equipped with mass. In virtue of 
possessing mass, particles accelerate in the sense that they attract each other (gravitational 
mass) as well as resist to acceleration (inertial mass), acceleration being the change of 
velocity in time and thus the second temporal derivative of position. Newton’s second law 
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describes how properties change the state of motion of particles by accelerating them. In 
doing so, Newton introduces the notion of forces. Thus, in virtue of possessing mass, particles 
exert a force of attraction upon each other, namely the force of gravitation. However, there is 
no need to subscribe to an ontological commitment to forces over and above a commitment to 
properties of the particles such as their mass. Given the masses of the particles at a time t and 
their positions and velocities at t, the acceleration of the particles at t is determined (modulo 
the gravitational constant). Forces are a device to calculate the consequences that the presence 
of properties such as mass has for the change of the state of motion of the particles, but no 
addition to being.4 The same goes for other properties that account for the change of the state 
of motion of particles in classical physics, such as their charge, giving rise to acceleration due 
to electromagnetic interaction: there is charge determining that interaction, but no force that 
acts in nature over and above there being charged particles. 
Finally, Newton’s natural philosophy has to answer a third question: How do the physical 
objects and their properties explain the observable phenomena? As the quotation above 
shows, Newton answers this question by maintaining that (a) all macrophysical objects are 
composed of microphysical particles and that (b) all differences in macrophysical objects can 
be traced back to the position (configuration) and the change of position (motion) of the 
microphysical particles. That is to say, the properties that account for the temporal 
development of the position of the microphysical particles (that is, their initial velocity and 
their mass, as well as their charge) thereby also account for all the variations in the 
macrophysical objects. 
Newton’s theory is a paradigmatic example of natural philosophy in that physics and 
metaphysics come together in this theory in an inseparable manner. Newton’s theory is not a 
naturalized metaphysics in the sense of being a positivist metaphysics: the assumption that 
there are particles and that properties of the particles have to be admitted that change the state 
of motion of the particles by accelerating them cannot be derived from any observation. It is 
an ontological postulate. But Newton’s theory is not a rationalist metaphysics either: there is 
no a priori justification of the commitment to particles and properties that accelerate them. 
Making these assumptions yields a theory that is both physical-mathematical and 
metaphysical in one, being a universal physical theory that has the ambition to provide for a 
complete ontology of nature, and whose justification consists in its success in predicting and 
explaining the observable phenomena. 
3. Relativity physics, quantum non-locality, and the metaphysics of time 
There is, however, a stumbling block in Newton’s theory, namely the assumption that 
particles interact instantantaneously across empty space. Maxwell’s field theory of 
electromagnetism developed in the 19th century provides the means to overcome this 
stumbling block: in virtue of being charged, particles create a field, and their interaction is 
transmitted by the field and thus retarded. Hence, instead of action at a distance, there is local 
action: interactions propagate from a space-time point to its neighbouring points. They are 
thereby transmitted with a finite velocity. In fact, the velocity of light is the upper limit for the 
propagation of effects. 
                                                
4 See e.g. Jammer (1957, pp. 243-245). As regards the contemporary discussion about the ontological status 
of Newtonian forces, see notably Bigelow, Ellis and Pargetter (1988), Wilson (2007) and Massin (2009). 
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In the special theory of relativity, Einstein (1905) draws the consequences of the field 
solution to the problem of action at a distance in Newtonian mechanics. This theory is built on 
the following two principles: 
1. All inertial reference frames are equivalent for the description of physical phenomena. 
2. The velocity of light is a constant, being independent of the state of motion of its source 
and thus the same in all inertial reference frames. 
Principle (1) is taken over from pre-relativistic physics, going back to Galilei. Principle (2) 
implements the field solution to the problem of action at a distance in Newtonian mechanics. 
It implies that the Galilean transformations are no longer applicable when switching from one 
inertial reference frame to another one. They have to be replaced with the Lorentz 
transformations. The latter unify space and time in the following sense: only the four-
dimensional, spatio-temporal distance between any two events occurring at space-time points 
is an invariant. This is the reason for the claim that following the special theory of relativity, 
space and time are not separate entities, but are unified in a four-dimensional space-time. 
In order to draw metaphysical conclusions from these two principles, one does not have to 
assume that the special theory of relativity is true. Indeed, strictly speaking, it is false, since 
the general theory of relativity no longer treats space-time as a non-dynamical background. 
Nonetheless, these two principles carry over from the special to the general theory of 
relativity. One can therefore presume that these two principles put a constraint on any future 
theory of space-time, whatever the further content of such a theory may be. 
These two principles suggest certain consequences for the metaphysics of time. They entail 
that there is no objective simultaneity, because any two events that are simultaneous in one 
inertial reference frame are not simultaneous in other inertial reference frames, and all inertial 
reference frames are equivalent; in other words, there is no unique foliation of space-time into 
spatial hypersurfaces that are ordered in time. Consequently, any metaphysics of time that is 
based on the tenses – the past, the present, the future – being objective features of the world 
and that ties existence to tense is incompatible with these two features. 
In particular, presentism is refuted by these two principles: presentism is the view that only 
what is present exists. What is past no longer exists, and what is future does not exist as yet. 
Presentism, thus construed, takes for granted that there is a unique foliation of four-
dimensional space-time into three-dimensional spatial hypersurfaces that are ordered in time.5 
It is the view that these hypersurfaces come into and go out of existence such that always only 
one such hypersurface exists – the present one. Monton (2006, p. 264) characterizes this view 
as “Heraclitean presentism”, because its central tenet is the reality of change in the sense of 
events coming into being and going out of being. Presentism thus is opposed to eternalism 
according to which everything that there is in nature simply exists. In the context of the 
special and the general theory of relativity, the latter position is known as the view of the 
block universe: everything that there is in space-time simply exists. Consequently, there is no 
temporal becoming in the sense of something coming into being as time passes. 
There are strategies available to avoid drawing the metaphysical conclusion of the block 
universe view from relativity physics. The most prominent strategy that one can try is 
solipsism: if one assumes that only the space-time point at which one is situated – my “here” 
and “now” – exists, then no contradiction with the mentioned two principles arises (see Stein 
                                                
5 But see Fine (2005, ch. 8, § 10, pp. 298-307) for a view that relativizes existence to inertial frames. 
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1968 for setting out that option and e.g. Harrington 2008 for endorsing it). But solipsism 
certainly is not a serious metaphysical stance based on science. Wüthrich (2013, sections 3-6) 
examines the various strategies envisaged in the literature to avoid the conclusion of the block 
universe view and convincingly argues that all these strategies are desperate. In short, taking 
the metaphysical position of presentism to be refuted by relativity physics and regarding 
eternalism in the form of the block universe view as vindicated by relativity physics is a 
straightforward metaphysical conclusion from space-time physics, if anything ever is a 
straightforward metaphysical conclusion from a scientific theory. 
However, metaphysics of science is not concerned with metaphysical conclusions that one 
may draw from one particular scientific theory. Any metaphysics of science, whatever 
methodology it pursues, seeks to develop a coherent and complete vision of nature on the 
basis of our mature scientific theories. Thus, in order to build metaphysical conclusions on a 
particular scientific theory, two conditions have to be met: (a) the principles of the scientific 
theory in question on which the metaphysical conclusions at issue are based have to be such 
that we have reason to believe that these principles put a constraint on any future successor 
theory of the scientific theory in question. (b) The scientific theory in question either has to be 
itself a complete fundamental physical theory or there have to be no other contemporary 
mature scientific theories that challenge its principles. As argued above, condition (a) is 
satisfied in this case. However, condition (b) is not fulfilled: quantum physics is a mature 
science that has at least the same scientific standing as relativity physics. Quantum physics 
challenges the conjunction of the two principles on which relativity physics is based. 
A popular way of setting out that challenge invokes what is known as the collapse of the 
wave-function in a quantum measurement process. However, whether such a collapse really 
occurs as a process in nature is a controversial issue, as we will see in the next section. The 
collapse view of measurement does not meet condition (a). There is no challenge to the block 
universe metaphysics stemming from wave-function collapse in quantum mechanics (see 
Callender 2008). Nonetheless, it is true that quantum physics calls the conjunction of the two 
principles on which relativity physics is based into question. 
John Bell, in one of his last papers entitled “La nouvelle cuisine” (1990), formulates a 
principle of local causality: “The direct causes (and effects) of events are near by, and even 
the indirect causes (and effects) are no further away than permitted by the velocity of light” 
(quoted from Bell 2004, p. 239). No particular notion of causation is implied here (see Bell 
2004, p. 240). The idea is that whatever events whose occurrence contributes to determining 
the probabilities for a given event to happen at a certain space-time point are located in the 
past light-cone of that event. This is one way of formulating the principle of local action that 
is implemented in classical field theories and that overcomes Newtonian action at a distance. 
Since relativity physics endorses this principle, it can waive the commitment to a unique 
temporal order of events and thus the commitment to an objective simultaneity: whatever 
contributes to determining a given event is situated in its past light cone; consequently, there 
is no need to settle for a unique temporal order of events that are situated outside each others 
light cones. 
Consider the thought experiment of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) (1935) in the 
version of Bohm (1951, pp. 611-622). Two elementary quantum particles are prepared in an 
entangled spin state at the source of the experiment (such as two systems of spin 1/2 in the 
singlet state). Later, when they are far apart in space so that there is no interaction any more 
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between them, Alice chooses the spin parameter to measure in her wing of the experiment and 
obtains an outcome, and Bob does the same in his wing of the experiment. Alice’s setting of 
her apparatus is separated by a spacelike interval from Bob’s setting of his apparatus. The 
following figure illustrates this situation: 
 
 
Figure 1: The situation that Bell considers in the proof of his theorem. Figure taken from 
Seevinck (2010, appendix) with permission of the author. 
 
In this figure, a stands for Alice’s measurement setting, A for Alice’s outcome, b stands for 
Bob’s measurement setting, B for Bob’s outcome, and λ ranges over whatever in the past may 
influence the behaviour of the measured quantum systems according to the theory under 
consideration (which may be standard quantum mechanics, or a theory that admits additional, 
so-called hidden variables). 
Bell’s principle of local causality – or locality for short – can then be formulated in the 
following manner: 
 Pa,b (A I B, λ) = Pa (A I λ) (1) 
 Pa,b (B I A, λ) = Pb (B I λ) 
That is to say: the probabilities for Alice’s outcome depend only on her measurement setting 
and λ. Adding Bob’s setting and outcome does not change the probabilities for Alice’s 
outcome. The same goes for Bob. The theorem that Bell proved in 1964 (reprinted in Bell 
2004, ch. 2) establishes that quantum mechanics violates (1). That is to say, for some 
measurement settings, even if the probabilities for Alice’s outcome A depend only on her 
setting a and the past state λ, it is then necessarily so that the probabilities for Bob’s outcome 
B depend not only on his setting b and the past state λ, but also on Alice’s setting a and 
outcome A, although b and B are separated by a spacelike interval from a and A. Moreover, 
any theory that reproduces the well-confirmed experimental predictions of quantum 
mechanics has to violate (1). This conclusion applies not only to quantum mechanics, but also 
to quantum field theory.6 One can therefore say that Bell’s theorem puts a constraint on any – 
present or future – physical theory that is to match the experimentally confirmed predictions 
of quantum mechanics. 
The proof of Bell’s theorem does not depend on the truth of quantum mechanics or 
quantum field theory. The theorem then establishes that any theory that complies with the 
                                                
6 See Bell (2004, ch. 24). See Hofer-Szabó and Vescernyés (2013) as well as Lazarovici (2014) for the 
current discussion. 
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predictions for macrophysical measurement outcomes of quantum mechanics or quantum 
field theory – whatever its content may be – cannot satisfy the locality principle (1). One can 
limit the point at issue of Bell’s theorem to correlations between space-like separated 
macrophysical measurement outcomes, such as the directions in which pointers point. In other 
words, even if one abstains from hypotheses about the microphysical constitution of such 
macrophysical events, one still gets Bell’s theorem. 
Nonetheless, the proof of Bell’s theorem requires more than the locality principle (1): it 
requires also that the measurement settings a and b are independent of the past state λ. Failure 
of such independence can arise in two different ways: either the measurement settings exert 
some influence on λ, or λ somehow influences the measurement settings. It is obvious from 
Figure 1 that the first option involves influences travelling backwards in time. Indeed, any 
attempt to save the locality principle (1) by relying on backwards causation retroactively 
correlates the measurement settings a and b with the past state λ: the settings a and b 
influence the outcomes A and B, which in turn retroactively influence λ.7 The second option 
contradicts the presupposition that the measurement settings can be freely chosen by an 
experimental physicist or a random generator. 
However, the assumption of such an independence is not specific for Bell’s theorem, but 
applies to any experimental evidence: if the behaviour of the measured system that produces 
the measurement outcome were correlated with the parameter that is measured on the system, 
then no conclusions about the constitution of nature would be possible on the basis of 
experimental evidence. Furthermore, this assumption does not imply any sort of 
indeterminism. A physical theory with a completely deterministic dynamics can satisfy this 
assumption – as does for instance Bohmian mechanics in the quantum case.8 It is therefore a 
well-grounded conclusion to maintain that quantum physics refutes the locality principle (1).9 
If the probabilities for what happens in a given space-time region are influenced by what 
happens in regions that are separated by a spacelike interval from that region, then the 
mentioned two principles on which the special and the general theory of relativity are built are 
challenged. It would, however, be unwarranted to conclude that there are signals travelling 
with a velocity that is much higher than the velocity of light. There is no precisely formulated 
version of quantum theory that includes superluminal signals, although one can contemplate 
models of quantum non-locality that are built on the idea of superluminal signals, as notably 
Chang and Cartwright (1993, section III) do. If events that occur in a space-time region that is 
separated from a given space-time region by a spacelike interval contribute to determining 
what happens in the latter region, this suggests that there is a unique or objective temporal 
order between these events. In other words, the principle that is challenged is the one of the 
equivalence of all inertial reference frames (special relativity) so that there is no unique 
                                                
7 See Price (1996, ch. 8 and 9) for a prominent such attempt. See the papers in Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2008), pp. 705-784, for discussion. 
8 See the exhange on this issue between Bell, Shimony, Horne and Clauser in Bell et al. (1985). The so-
called free will theorem by Conway and Kochen (2006 and 2009) does not show anything standing up to 
scrutiny that is not already given by Bell’s theorem. See notably Tumulka (2009), Goldstein et al. (2010) 
and Wüthrich (2011). 
9 See Maudlin (2011, chs. 1-6), Norsen (2009), Seevinck (2010) and Seevinck and Uffink (2011) for the 
current state of the discussion on Bell’s theorem. 
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foliation of space-time into three-dimensional, spatial hypersurfaces that are ordered in time 
(general relativity). 
Even if one takes the EPR-correlations between space-like separated events to require a 
unique temporal order of these events, one does not have to contradict any of the experimental 
evidence for the special and the general theory of relativity. Quantum non-locality then 
implies that there is more structure of space-time than is admitted by relativity physics, but 
this additional structure is not accessible by experience – otherwise, one could use quantum 
non-locality for superluminal communication. However, this is not possible. The reason is, in 
brief, that one cannot control the measurement outcomes A and B (and if there are additional, 
so called hidden variables in λ, one cannot have full access to these variables). The conflict 
between quantum physics (quantum mechanics, quantum field theory) and relativity physics 
(special relativity, general relativity) does not arise on the operational level, but only on the 
ontological level (cf. Albert 2000). Even if one regards quantum non-locality as evidence for 
there being a unique foliation of space-time into spatial hypersurfaces that are ordered in time, 
one is by no means committed to going back to endorse an ether that serves as the privileged 
inertial frame. On the contrary, one may contemplate the idea that the distribution of mass in 
the universe fixes the objective foliation of space-time, or that the universal wave-function 
does so (see Dürr et al. 2013b). 
Introducing on the basis of quantum non-locality the assumption that there is a unique 
foliation of space-time rules out the inference from relativity physics to eternalism in the form 
of the block universe metaphysics. However, this assumption does not as such contain an 
argument that favours presentism over eternalism. One can even raise doubts whether this 
assumption is compatible with the presentism that draws its support from common sense, 
given notably that this unique foliation of space-time is not empirically accessible (see 
Callender 2008). In any case, in metaphysics of science, arguments based on common sense 
(or on intuitions about time, or on an a priori analysis of the concept of time) are not 
admissible. If one sets out to make a case for presentism, one has to develop positive 
arguments for this metaphysics of time based on science. The lesson of the tension between 
relativity physics and quantum non-locality as established by Bell’s theorem is not that 
physics favours presentism over eternalism, or that physics is neutral with respect to this 
metaphysical debate, but only the following methodological one: building metaphysical 
conclusions on a physical theory requires spelling out how this theory can accommodate all 
the available evidence in its domain, and assessing this evidence involves both physics and 
metaphysics in an inseparable manner. I will come back to this conclusion in section 5, 
showing there that the stance that one takes with respect to this tension depends on one’s 
views about laws of nature and objective modality. 
4. The problem of the referent of quantum physics 
Let us now turn to quantum mechanics. In this case, there is no straightforward answer to the 
question of what this theory tells us about the world, supposing that it is true or approximately 
true. Instead of being a theory like Newtonian mechanics in which the physics itself 
implements a certain ontology, we have to engage in the business of interpreting quantum 
mechanics, its interpretation involving to settle for a specific mathematical formulation of 
quantum mechanics that then enables an answer to the question of what the theory tells us 
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about the world. Again, physics and metaphysics are inseparable, since metaphysical 
considerations determine the choice of the mathematical formulation of the physical theory. 
The following, easily accessible thought experiment suggested by Einstein at the Solvay 
conference in Brussels in 1927 illustrates this situation (my presentation is based on de 
Broglie’s version of the thought experiment in de Broglie 1964, pp. 28-29, and on Norsen 
2005): consider a box which is prepared in such a way that there is a single elementary 
quantum particle in it. The box is split in two halves that are sent in opposite directions, say 
from Brussels to Paris and Tokyo. Suppose that Alice in Tokyo opens the box she receives 
and finds it to be empty. If Alice’s box is empty, it then is a fact that there is a particle in the 
box that Bob receives in Paris. 
The textbook quantum formalism represents the particle in the box by means of a wave-
function. When the box is split and the two halves are sent to Paris and to Tokyo, the wave-
function represents the particle in terms of a superposition of its being in the box that travels 
to Paris and its being in the box that travels to Tokyo. The operational meaning of this 
representation is that there is a 50% chance of finding the particle in the box that travels to 
Paris and a 50% chance of finding the particle in the box that travels to Tokyo. When Alice in 
Tokyo opens the box she receives and finds it to be empty, this representation changes such 
that the wave-function represents the particle to be located in the box that travels to Paris. 
That sudden change is known as the collapse of the wave-function. 
The problem with this formalism is the following one: if one takes the collapse of the 
wave-function upon measurement to represent a process that occurs in nature, one is 
committed to what Einstein called “spooky action at a distance” – the local operation of 
opening the box in Tokyo creates the fact that there is a particle in the box in Paris. If, by 
contrast, one takes the collapse of the wave-function upon measurement to represent an 
updating of information of the observer, such that before opening the box the observer does 
not know where the particle is, one is committed to the view that textbook quantum 
mechanics is an incomplete physical theory – the particle then was all the time in the box 
travelling to Paris, and the formalism of textbook quantum mechanics is unable to represent 
its trajectory. Bell’s theorem then shows that one cannot complete quantum mechanics in 
terms of a local dynamics – that is, a dynamics complying with the locality principle (1) 
(although in this particular case of one particle in a box, a local account is possible and 
provided by de Broglie’s and Bohm’s quantum theory). But Bell’s theorem does not settle the 
issue of whether or not the representation in terms of the wave-function is a complete 
representation of quantum objects and whether or not wave-function collapse indicates a 
process that occurs in nature. 
Indeed, the problem of understanding quantum mechanics goes deeper than answering the 
question of what wave-function collapse stands for. Generally speaking, in quantum 
mechanics, the phase space of classical mechanics is replaced with a configuration space each 
point of which represents a possible configuration of particles in three-dimensional space.10 
Thus, if there are N particles, the configuration space has 3N dimensions. On this 
configuration space a quantum state of the particles is defined, which can be expressed in 
terms of a wave-function that is a field in configuration space and that develops in time 
                                                
10 See North (2013, section 2) for an argument why one should regard configuration space, and not Hilbert 
space, as the fundamental state space of quantum mechanics. 
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according to the Schrödinger equation. This has the consequence that whenever one considers 
the states of two or more quantum systems, the occurrence of entangled states of these 
systems is generic, and their states will in general remain entangled, unless wave-function 
collapse occurs. 
This formalism runs into the following problem of understanding: on the one hand, it seems 
to be committed to particles, since the dimension of the configuration space is defined by the 
number of particles considered. On the other hand, the law (i.e. the Schrödinger equation) is 
not a differential equation that is about the temporal development of a particle configuration 
in three-dimensional space (i.e. the development of particle positions and thus particle 
trajectories), but about the temporal development of a wave-function in configuration space. 
The fundamental problem of understanding this formalism therefore is that there is an 
underdetermination of what its referent is: Is it objects in ordinary space? Or is it a wave-
function in configuration space? By way of consequence, metaphysics has to come in to settle 
the very issue of what the formalism of quantum mechanics is about. 
It is usually taken for granted that the natural world consists in matter distributed in three-
dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time and that the task of physics is to develop 
an account of matter and its temporal development (plus an account of space and time 
themselves). However, in a famous paper about realism in quantum mechanics, Albert (1996) 
claims the contrary: 
… it has been essential (…) to the project of quantum-mechanical realism (in whatever 
particular form it takes …) to learn to think of wave functions as physical objects in and of 
themselves. And of course the space those sorts of objects live in, and (therefore) the space we 
live in, the space in which any realistic understanding of quantum mechanics is necessarily 
going to depict the history of the world as playing itself out (…) is configuration space. And 
whatever impression we have to the contrary (whatever impression we have, say, of living in a 
three-dimensional space, or in a four-dimensional space-time) is somehow flatly illusory. (Albert 
1996, p. 277, emphasis in the original; see also Albert 2013 as well as Ney 2011 and North 
2013) 
This stance is known as wave-function realism. It is motivated by attributing a literal meaning 
to the fact that the Schrödinger equation is about the temporal development of a wave-
function in a high-dimensional space: this stance takes that wave-function to be the object of 
quantum mechanics. Hence, the wave-function is an ordinary physical object, as particles or 
fields are ordinary physical objects in three-dimensional space in classical mechanics. The 
drawback of this move is that it cannot attribute a literal meaning to the fact that the 
dimension of the space in which the wave-function exists is defined in terms of the number of 
particles in three-dimensional space. Indeed, when one adopts this stance, the term 
“configuration space” becomes obsolete: there is no given configuration of anything that 
points of this space represent. The physical reality is the wave-function – to be precise, the 
wave-function of the universe – existing as a field in configuration space. 
If one endorses this stance, the obvious task then is to develop an account of our experience 
of objects localized in three-dimensional space and moving in that space. In the meantime, 
Albert (2013) has withdrawn his claim from 1996 that doing so implies regarding our 
impression of living in a three-dimensional space as “somehow flatly illusory” and announces 
a forthcoming account of the objects of common sense in functional terms, so that from wave-
function realism one can derive common sense realism instead of having to reject the latter. 
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However, as yet, such an account has not been accomplished, neither in Albert’s version of 
wave-function realism, nor in the contemporary versions of what is known as Everettian 
quantum mechanics.11 
Even if such an account were set out in detail, wave-function realism would not be 
established as simply following from the formalism of quantum mechanics. It would still 
require metaphysical argument to justify the conclusion that the very high dimensional space 
on which the wave-function of the universe is defined is the realm of physical reality, instead 
of three-dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time. The reason is that it is impossible 
to satisfy both the above mentioned elements, namely (a) that the state space of quantum 
mechanics is a configuration space whose dimension is determined by the number of particles 
existing in three-dimensional space and whose points represent possible given configurations 
of those particles and that (b) the fundamental law of quantum mechanics is a dynamical 
equation that is about the temporal development of the wave-function in that space. In other 
words, one cannot have both (a) a configuration space that represents a physical reality 
outside that space and (b) a fundamental law that is about the temporal development of an 
object inside that space. 
Wave-function realism endorses (b) and abandons (a). The other option is to endorse (a) 
and to abandon (b). If one takes quantum mechanics to be about a physical reality in three-
dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time, one is committed to what is known as a 
primitive ontology of quantum mechanics (this term goes back to Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì 
2013a, ch. 2, end of section 2, originally published 1992). That ontology is primitive at least 
in the sense that it cannot be inferred from the formalism of quantum mechanics, but that it 
has to be put in as the referent of that formalism. Consequently, the fundamental law then has 
to be a law that describes the temporal development of the elements of the primitive ontology 
in three-dimensional space or four-dimensional space-time, and that law can obviously not be 
the Schrödinger equation (see Allori et al. 2008 for the structure of primitive ontology 
theories). 
The de Broglie-Bohm quantum theory, going back to de Broglie (1928) and Bohm (1952) 
and known today as Bohmian mechanics (see the papers in Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghì 
2013a) is the oldest and most widely known primitive ontology theory of quantum mechanics. 
Bohmian mechanics endorses particles as the primitive ontology, adding the position of the 
particles as additional, so-called hidden variable to the formalism of textbook quantum 
mechanics (so that the wave-function is not a complete representation of physical reality, 
                                                
11 Wallace (2012) is the most detailed contemporary version of Everettian quantum mechanics. He rejects 
wave-function realism, maintaining, in brief, that the quantum state (which can be represented by the 
wave-function of the universe) is a state instantiated in four-dimensional space-time, developing in such a 
way that there are many four-dimensional space-times existing in parallel (“multiverse”, “branches of the 
universe”) (see in particular chs. 2 and 8). Nonetheless, the problem of developing an account of the 
experience of objects as well as ourselves being localized in one four-dimensional space-time arises in this 
theory in the same manner as in the one of Albert. Furthermore, Wallace’s position amounts to what is 
known as super-substantivalism (Sklar 1974, pp. 221-224). If one maintains that physical properties or 
states are properties or states of space-time itself instead of being instantiated by objects localized in space-
time, thus avoiding a commitment to what is known as a primitive ontology of objects in space-time, one 
has to elaborate on a theory of how physical properties can be properties of space-time itself – otherwise, 
one only performs what Sklar (1974, pp. 166-167, 222-223) describes as a linguistic trick, namely 
changing language in attributing the properties that are usually ascribed to objects in space-time to space-
time itself. 
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since it does not represent the actual particle positions). Consequently, there is at any time one 
actual configuration of particles in three-dimensional space, and the particles move on 
continuous trajectories in physical space. The fundamental law of Bohmian mechanics is the 
guiding equation, describing the temporal development of the position of the particles in 
three-dimensional space. The wave-function, as it figures in the guiding equation, has the job 
to determine the velocity of the particles at any time t given their position at t. The 
Schrödinger equation then comes in as an additional law, describing how the wave-function 
itself develops in time. 
Strictly speaking, only the universal wave-function – that is, the wave-function of the 
configuration of all the particles in the universe – fulfills this job: strictly speaking, the 
velocity of any particle at t depends on the position of all the particles in the universe at t via 
the universal wave-function. That is the way in which Bohmian mechanics takes into account 
the non-locality established by Bell’s theorem. Nonetheless, in many situations, the position 
of distant particles is de facto irrelevant for the trajectory of a given particle (as in the case of 
the particle in Einstein’s boxes). Since this theory is committed to particles moving on 
continuous trajectories, there is no need for wave-function collapse as a process in nature to 
account for measurement outcomes: these consist simply in certain particle configurations, 
developing according to the guiding equation. If one assumes that the initial particle 
configuration of the universe is typical in a precise mathematical sense, it is possible to derive 
in Bohmian mechanics Born’s rule for the calculation of probabilities for measurement 
outcomes via what is known as the quantum equilibrium hypothesis (see Dürr, Goldstein and 
Zanghì 2013a, ch. 2, originally published 1992). 
Instead of subscribing to the Bohmian guiding equation, one can also go for a modification 
of the Schrödinger equation such that this equation includes conditions under which the wave-
function localizes spontaneously in configuration space, thus enabling it to represent objects 
that are localized in three-dimensional space. The most precise proposal in that respect is the 
one going back to Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (GRW) (1986). However, the GRW law still is 
about the temporal development of the wave-function in configuration space, by contrast to a 
differential equation that is about the temporal development of objects in three-dimensional 
space. One therefore still has to put in a primitive ontology as the referent of the GRW 
formalism. There are two proposals in that respect developed in the literature. 
The one proposal is committed to gunk in the sense of a matter density field in three-
dimensional space: the temporal development of the wave-function represents the temporal 
development of the matter density in space-time, with the spontaneous localization of the 
wave-function in configuration space (its collapse) representing the spontaneous contraction 
of gunk in certain locations so that measurement outcomes and, in general, well-localized 
macroscopic objects are accounted for (see Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti 1995). Again, the 
dynamics is non-local, since the spontaneous contraction of gunk can occur all over space, 
independently of spatial distances. Thus, in the mentioned case of a particle in a box, when 
the box is split in two halves, the matter density of the particle strectches over both the half-
boxes and spontaneously localizes in one of them upon measurement. 
The other proposal is committed to single events, known as flashes, occurring at space-time 
points: whenever there is a spontaneous localization of the wave-function in configuration 
space, this collapse of the wave-function represents an event occurring in space-time, in the 
sense of a flash appearing centred around a space-time point. More precisely, the dynamics 
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being non-local again, the collapse of the wave-function represents the spontaneous 
occurrence of spacelike separated, but nonetheless correlated flashes. The flash-events are all 
there is in space-time. Hence, there is no continuous distribution of matter in physical space, 
namely no trajectories or worldlines of particles, and no field – such as a matter density field 
– either. There only is a sparse distribution of single events in space-time (see Bell 2004, ch. 
22, originally published 1987, and Tumulka 2006). 
In any case, one needs a principle or a law that establishes the link between the primitive 
ontology and the GRW equation such that the GRW equation can fulfill the function of 
describing the temporal development of the elements of the primitive ontology in three-
dimensional space (cf. Monton 2004). In a coherent formulation of the theory, that principle 
or law has to stand as the fundamental one, if the theory is to be about the temporal 
development of matter in three-dimensional space. 
Against this background, consider the following three metaphysical claims that are often 
put forward as following directly from the formalism of quantum mechanics: 
1) Quantum mechanics refutes the standard metaphysical view of objects, namely that 
objects are individuals, possessing an identity that distinguishes each object from all the 
other ones. The whole debate about the status of quantum particles takes for granted that 
the standard view is refuted and that the point at issue following quantum mechanics only 
is whether a notion of weak discernibility can bestow some sort of individuality on 
quantum particles (Saunders 2006) or whether even this is not possible (Ladyman and 
Bigaj 2010). 
2) Since the formalism of quantum mechanics does not specify any particular objects in 
space-time as its referent and since interpreting quantum physics as being about objects as 
traditionally conceived leads to an underdetermination between an ontology of individuals 
and an ontology of non-individuals, quantum mechanics grounds a metaphysics of 
structures, known as ontic structural realism – by contrast to the object-based metaphysics 
that is taken for granted in mainstream analytic philosophy. This is the central claim of the 
naturalized metaphysics argued for by Ladyman and Ross (2007). 
3) Quantum physics has implications for the metaphysics of modality: in particular, it refutes 
Lewis’s thesis of Humean supervenience. This claim is widespread in the literature on the 
metaphysics of quantum physics since the seminal paper of Teller (1986). Maudlin (2007, 
ch. 2, pp. 51-64) turns it into a forceful attack on Humeanism in general based on 
quantum physics. 
However, as regards the first two claims, they fail to consider the issue of what exactly the 
formalism of quantum mechanics represents. There is no point in seeking to draw 
metaphysical consequences from a formalism that contains operators which are introduced in 
order to allow for the calculation of probabilities of measurement outcomes – doing so would 
amount to what is known as naïve realism about operators (see Daumer et al. 1997). And 
there is no point in proposing a metaphysics of structures without considering how these 
structures are instantiated in the physical realm (see Esfeld 2013). Concerning the third claim, 
I will show in the next section that it goes through only if one presupposes an anti-Humean 
metaphysics of laws of nature. If, by contrast, one endorses Humeanism about laws, Lewis’s 
thesis of Humean supervenience can be literally true even in the light of quantum physics. 
The considerations in this section seek to establish that one cannot read off a metaphysics 
from the formalism of quantum mechanics, because the formalism as such does not specify its 
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referent. The first task for naturalized metaphysics in this area therefore is to chart out the 
options for providing a referent for quantum mechanics. By way of consequence, what one 
proposes as the mathematical formulation of a fully developed quantum theory depends on 
metaphysical considerations. Moreover, all the known options for specifying the referent of 
the formalism of quantum mechanics are committed to objects, and these options cover all the 
traditional kinds of objects – namely particles, gunk (a matter field), and single events. 
If one takes the universal wave-function to be the referent of quantum physics, then the 
object to which quantum physics is committed is a field, albeit a field in an extremely high 
dimensional space by contrast to a field in four-dimensional space-time. But the field then has 
definite numerical values at the points of that high-dimensional space so that these values can 
be regarded as intrinsic properties occurring at the points of that space. Furthermore, the 
dynamical law for the temporal development of this field in that space is local (as long as it is 
given by a linear dynamical equation such as the Schrödinger equation). Consequently, if one 
takes the universal wave-function to be the referent of quantum physics, one obtains a 
traditional field ontology with a local dynamics as in classical field theory. There hence is in 
this case no motivation for basing a metaphysics of structures on quantum physics (see Albert 
1996, p. 283, note 7). 
If, by contrast, one goes for a primitive ontology of matter distributed in ordinary space-
time as the referent of the formalism of quantum physics, then there is continuity in the space 
in which the physical reality plays itself out, namely four-dimensional space-time, and there is 
continuity in objects from classical to quantum mechanics – particles, a matter field, single 
events being the options for a primitive ontology of quantum mechanics as outlined above. 
However, there then is change in the mathematical structure of the theory from classical to 
quantum mechanics, since the law for the temporal development of these objects then has to 
be a non-local one, in order to meet the conditions set by Bell’s theorem. One can then regard 
this non-local law as being grounded in a modal structure that takes all the physical objects as 
its relata and that determines their temporal development (in a deterministic or probabilistic 
manner) (see Esfeld 2013). Nonetheless, in any case, these physical objects come with their 
own identity conditions: particles and single events are absolutely discernible due to their 
position in physical space, and a matter field is one continuous object distributed all over 
physical space. In sum, there is no point in seeking to draw metaphysical conclusions about 
objects directly from the formalism of quantum mechanics. One first has to settle what one 
takes to be the referent of that formalism, and doing so brings in metaphysical considerations. 
Once this has been done, there then is no longer an issue about the discernibility or the 
identity conditions of quantum objects. 
5. Physics and the metaphysics of modality 
Let us assume that the referent of the formalism of quantum mechanics is the distribution of 
matter in ordinary space-time. It then seems obvious that entanglement shows that quantum 
mechanics refutes Humean metaphysics, in particular David Lewis’s thesis of Humean 
supervenience: 
It is the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, 
just one little thing and then another. (…) We have geometry: a system of external relations of 
spatio-temporal distance between points. … And at those points we have local qualities: 
perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be 
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instantiated. For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. … All else 
supervenes on that. (Lewis 1986, pp. ix-x) 
It seems evident that Lewis’s view of the supervenience basis, consisting exclusively in the 
distribution of intrinsic physical properties located at space-time points, is contradicted by the 
fact of there being relations of quantum entanglement (see Teller 1986 and for a recent 
statement of this view Humphreys 2013, pp. 56-57). Notably Maudlin (2007, ch. 2, pp. 51-64) 
argues that quantum entanglement (the non-separability of quantum states) refutes not only 
Lewis’s conception of the supervenience basis, but thereby also the Humean rejection of 
objective modality. The formalism of quantum physics thus has a direct bearing not only on 
what there is in the fundamental physical domain of the actual world, but also on which 
philosophical views of modality – and thereby of laws of nature – are admissible. 
Lewis’s reason for proposing a metaphysics of fundamental physics that recognizes only 
intrinsic properties located at space-time points is free combinatorialism: one can hold any 
local quality occurring at a space-time point fixed and vary all the other local qualities, the 
result always is a possible world. Any property occurrences can be combined with any other 
property occurrences, no instantiation of a property poses any restrictions on what the world 
has to be like beyond the space-time point at which the property in question is instantiated. 
Hence, there are no necessary connections in the world. 
Philosophers with a favourable attitude towards Humeanism reacted to the challenge from 
quantum physics by trying to adapt Humeanism so that quantum entanglement is taken into 
account. The most important suggestion in this respect is to admit irreducible relations of 
entanglement over and above the spatio-temporal relations to the ontological ground floor of 
Humeanism (Darby 2012) and to envisage developing a Humean version of ontic structural 
realism on the basis of including such relations (Lyre 2010). However, recognizing 
irreducible relations of quantum entanglement considerably restricts free combinatorialism 
and arguably implies a commitment to some sort of objective modality, since these relations 
tie the temporal development of – in the last resort all – quantum systems together, whatever 
their spatial distance may be. Thus, considering the EPR experiment with the same parameter 
measured in both wings of the experiment, if in one wing the measured quantum system 
behaves in such a way that the measurement outcome is spin up, then it is necessarily so that 
in the other wing the measured quantum system behaves in such a way that the measurement 
outcome is spin down. If one does not want to talk about two systems in this respect, one can 
also formulate this point by saying that if in one wing of the experiment the pointer of the 
measuring apparatus indicates the outcome spin up, then it is necessarily so that in the other 
wing of the experiment the pointer of the measuring apparatus indicates the outcome spin 
down. Consequently, in any case, if there are relations of quantum entanglement in the 
supervenience basis, these relations pose a constraint on what can and what cannot happen 
elsewhere in space-time. 
Furthermore, one can adapt Humeanism to quantum physics by adopting wave-function 
realism and admitting the very high-dimensional configuration space of the universe instead 
of four-dimensional space-time as the realm of physical reality (Loewer 1996). In this case, as 
mentioned at the end of the last section, everything is local in that space. Nonetheless, it is a 
considerable change of Humean metaphysics, which is inspired by common sense realism, to 
switch to configuration space as the stage of the Humean supervenience basis. 
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However, in recent years, it has become clear that no such adaptation is necessary. 
Humeanism is not refuted by quantum physics. More precisely, Lewis’s thesis of Humean 
supervenience can be literally true even in the light of the empirical evidence for quantum 
entanglement. The background that enables Humeanism to stand firm is the development of 
primitive ontology theories of quantum physics, as outlined in the preceding section. To 
recap, the primitive ontology consists in the distribution of matter in three-dimensional space 
or four-dimensional space-time; that distribution is the referent of the formalism of quantum 
physics. Furthermore, a law is admitted as that what fixes (in a probabilistic or a deterministic 
manner) the temporal development of the distribution of matter in physical space, given an 
initial configuration of matter. That’s all. In particular, according to the primitive ontology 
theories, the quantum mechanical wave-function is part and parcel of the law instead of being 
a physical entity on a par with the primitive ontology. 
Since the primitive ontology is in any case constituted by local matters of particular fact – 
“local beables” to use Bell’s famous term (Bell 2004, ch. 7) –, the only move that the Humean 
has to make is this: instead of admitting the law as an entity that exists in addition to and 
independently of the primitive ontology, governing or guiding the temporal development of 
the primitive ontology, the Humean has to regard the law as supervening on the distribution 
of matter throughout the whole of space-time, that is, the entire mosaic of “local beables” or 
local matters of particular fact. This move has been made with respect to Bohm’s quantum 
theory in recent literature (see Callender unpublished, Esfeld et al. 2014, section 3, Miller 
2014). It is obvious that it can be extended also to the GRW matter density ontology and the 
GRW flash ontology (see Callender 2015 and Esfeld 2014). It is no objection to this move 
that the quantum mechanical wave-function does not supervene on the configuration of matter 
in space at any given time, since the Humean claims only that it supervenes on the entire 
distribution of matter in the whole of space-time. In a nutshell, on the Humean view, the 
universal wave-function is fixed only at the end of the world. If the entire distribution of 
matter in space-time were still to leave room for different universal wave-functions, that 
difference would not make any empirical difference and could therefore be dismissed by the 
Humean as a mathematical surplus structure. 
Indeed, already Bell himself recognized this position as a coherent stance in the paper in 
which he introduced the notion of “local beables” (1975) (“beable” is Bell’s neologism for 
what exists by contrast to “observable”, that is, what can be observed): 
One of the apparent non-localities of quantum mechanics is the instantaneous, over all space, 
‘collapse of the wave function’ on ‘measurement’. But this does not bother us if we do not grant 
beable status to the wave function. We can regard it simply as a convenient but inessential 
mathematical device for formulating correlations between experimental procedures and 
experimental results, i.e., between one set of beables and another. (Quoted from Bell 2004, p. 
53) 
Bell makes two points in this quotation: (1) It is not mandatory to grant beable status to the 
wave-function. If one admits “local beables”, one has an ontology of the physical world. Not 
granting beable status to the wave-function does, however, not commit one to an 
instrumentalist attitude to the wave-function, as Bell suggests here. Humeanism is distinct 
from instrumentalism (Miller 2014, section 5, stresses this point). The Humean only has to 
maintain that the primitive ontology is the full ontology, with everything else supervening on 
it. That is why Humeanism is also not touched by recent claims about experimental evidence 
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in favour of the reality of the wave-function (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph 2012; Colbeck and 
Renner 2012): these claims challenge only the view that the wave-function represents nothing 
but the information about probabilities for measurement outcomes that is available for an 
observer. However, on Humeanism, the universal wave-function is not relative to observers: it 
is an objective matter of fact in supervening on the entire distribution of the “local beables”. 
Since any experimental evidence consists in “local beables”, the Humean is in the position to 
accommodate whatever experimental evidence there may be. 
(2) Given that it is the wave-function which is entangled and which correlates “local 
beables” whatever their spatial or spatio-temporal distance is, if one does not grant beable 
status to the wave-function, there is no reason to admit non-supervenient relations of 
entanglement (or of dependence or of influence) among the “local beables” over and above 
their occurrence at space-time points. In being entangled, the wave-function establishes such 
correlations, but these are no addition to what there is over and above the occurrence of the 
“local beables” at space-time points, since the universal wave-function and its temporal 
development supervene on the entire mosaic of these “local beables”. Hence, even if one 
regards ordinary space-time as the realm of physical reality also in quantum physics, if one 
adopts Humeanism, there is again no motivation to go for ontic structural realism based on 
quantum physics. 
By way of consequence, if one takes the primitive ontology to be the full ontology, there is 
no problem with Lorentz-invariance, since the primitive ontology consists entirely in local 
matters of particular fact. However, as soon as one takes the entanglement of the wave-
function in configuration space to refer to dependency relations among some such local 
matters of particular fact over and above their simple occurrence at space-time points, then 
Bell’s theorem implies that there is no Lorentz-invariant theory of these dependency relations 
or influences possible: there then is a fact for any given flash-event, particle position or matter 
density value at a space-time point of whether or not the occurrence of that flash, particle 
position or matter density value depends on where other flash-events, particle positions or 
matter density values occur at spacelike separated locations. This conclusion is not called into 
question by the work of Tumulka (2006 and 2009) who has shown for the GRW flash 
ontology that the GRW law is Lorentz-invariant and that there is no problem with Lorentz-
invariance as long as one considers only probabilities for entire distributions of flashes in 
space-time;12 this important result does not touch upon the fact that for the occurrence of each 
new flash, it remains a meaningful question to ask whether or not the occurrence of that flash 
depends on or is influenced by where at a spacelike separated location other flashes occur, 
and there is no Lorentz-invariant answer to that question available (see Esfeld and Gisin 
2014). Consequently, the metaphysical issue of Humeanism vs. anti-Humeanism about laws 
of nature and objective modality has direct implications for the issue of whether or not a 
Lorentz-invariant quantum ontology of matter distributed in space-time is available. For the 
Humean, it is no problem to obtain such an ontology, whereas for the anti-Humean, such an 
ontology is not available. 
Since the Humean does not grant beable status to the wave-function, there is nothing that 
determines the temporal development of an initial configuration of “local beables”. The 
particle positions simply happen to develop in such a way that there are, as far as Bohmian 
                                                
12 Bedingham et al. (2014) seek to achieve a similar result for the GRW matter density field ontology. 
 Metaphysics of science as naturalized metaphysics  19
quantum mechanics is concerned, continuous particle trajectories; the matter density values 
just happen to develop in such a way that the matter density takes a certain shape making true 
the GRW law, and the flash-events just happen to occur in such a manner that they make true 
a law of the GRW type. There is nothing that drives, guides or forces them to do so. This is 
simply what the general Humean attitude towards laws and objective modality implies. One 
may have reservations about that attitude. But there is nothing in quantum physics that obliges 
one to abandon it. In brief, it is “anti-Humeanism in, anti-Humeanism out”, or “Humeanism 
in, Humeanism out”. If one assumes that the wave-function is some sort of a real entity over 
and above the primitive ontology, then quantum physics comes out anti-Humean. If, by 
contrast, one bases oneself on the empiricist idea that the primitive ontology is the full 
ontology, then one obtains a Humean ontology of quantum physics. 
This is not to say that physics has no bearing on the metaphysics of modality. One 
important argument in this respect is that Humeanism cannot explain why the regularities of 
physics – such as the law of gravitation – always turn out to be well-confirmed (and thus, for 
instance, why a human being cannot fly into the air without technical aid). On Humeanism, 
there is no constraint at all on which local matters of particular fact can and which ones 
cannot occur in the future of any given local matter of particular fact; the laws of nature 
supervene only on the mosaic of the local matters of particular fact in the whole of space-
time. Hence, what the laws of nature are depends on what there will happen in the future of 
any given local matter of particular fact, instead of that future depending on the laws of 
nature. Dispositional essentialism, the most prominent contemporary form of anti-Humeanism 
about laws of nature, by contrast, provides for such an explanation: to take up the example of 
the law of gravitation, if it is essential for the property of mass to exercize a causal role as 
described by the law of gravitation (whatever the correct law of gravitation may be), then this 
is the reason why the regularities of physics concerning gravitation always turn out to be well-
confirmed (and thus why it would be futile for a human being to try to fly into the air without 
technical aid) (see notably Bird 2007). The occurrence of mass then poses a constraint on 
what there can be in the future of any given such occurrence. By the same token, turning to 
quantum physics, dispositional essentialism (or modal ontic structural realism in this case) 
can and Humeanism cannot explain why the outcomes of an EPR type experiment always 
turn out to be correlated (namely because there is a dispositional property or modal structure 
of entanglement instantiated by the configuration of objects in physical space).13 However, an 
argument of this type is a general argument from physics against Humeanism, and not a 
refutation of Humeanism by a particular physical theory. 
Against this background, let us reconsider classical mechanics and draw some general 
conclusions. As pointed out in section 1, the commitment to properties of the primitive matter 
– that is, the particles – arises in Newton’s theory, because there is something that plays a 
causal role in the temporal development of the trajectories of the particles. Thus, in virtue of 
possessing mass, the particles accelerate each other. Referring to the property of gravitational 
mass instantiated by the particles provides for a causal explanation of the acceleration of the 
particles independently of whether or not a medium is indicated by means of which the 
influence that particles exert on each other’s state of motion is transmitted and independently 
                                                
13 See Dorato and Esfeld (2010) as well as Esfeld et al. (2014). 
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of whether or not time passes between the presence of gravitational mass (the cause) and the 
acceleration of the particles (the effect). 
In this vein, Blondeau and Ghins (2012) argue that the “general form of a causal law is an 
equation that exhibits the following mathematical form: 
 E = ∂ x / ∂ t = C1 + … Cn [(2)] 
E refers to the effect, whereas the causes Ci can, but need not, be functions of time. The above 
general form reads: C1, C2, … are the causes of the infinitesimal variation of the property x of 
a system, i.e. of the effect E” (p. 384). The decisive point is that any law fitting into this form 
is asymmetric in that what appears on the right side induces a certain temporal development 
of the quantity on the left side, but not vice versa, without any time having to pass between 
the presence of the causes C1 … Cn and the effect E, that is, the manner in which x develops in 
time. Thus, on Newton’s law of gravitation, the presence of gravitational mass induces a 
change in the velocity of the particles without any time passing between the presence of mass 
and the acceleration of the particles. 
For the Humean, the causal role that the properties referred to by “C1 + … Cn” in the 
formula above exercize is a contingent one: it varies from one possible world to another, 
supervening on the distribution of the local matters of particular fact in the world in question 
as a whole. Thus, it is contingent that the property we refer to as “mass” exercizes the role 
expressed in Newton’s law of gravitation in the actual world (assuming, for the sake of the 
argument, that Newton’s law is the correct law of gravitation for the actual world). The anti-
Humean, by contrast, does not regard that causal role as contingent. For the dispositional 
essentialist, properties are dispositions whose essence it is to exercize a certain causal role, 
such that whenever the property in question is instantiated in a possible world, it exercizes the 
same role in any world. The law expresses that role. 
Hence, as far as classical mechanics is concerned, the Humean and the anti-Humean can 
both agree that the matter distributed in space-time (i.e. the particles) instantiates certain 
properties such as mass, or charge. Their dispute concerns the issue of whether or not the 
causal role that these properties exercize according to the laws of classical mechanics 
(fulfilling the scheme indicated above) is contingent or necessary (essential) to them. 
However, when it comes to quantum physics, the Humean can no longer recognize such 
properties: whereas mass and charge can be considered as intrinsic properties of particles 
“which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated” (Lewis 1986, p. x), there 
are no such intrinsic properties as far as the features that are specific for quantum physics are 
concerned. If one seeks for properties in quantum physics that fill in the scheme provided by 
formula (2) above, these can only be relations or structures of entanglement, relating all the 
objects in physical space (be it particles, a matter density field, or flashes in the sense of 
single events). Thus, the dispositional essentialist can regard the quantum mechanical wave-
function as referring to a dispositional property or modal structure instantiated by the 
configuration of matter as a whole and determining (in a deterministic or probabilistic 
manner) the temporal development of the configuration of matter.14 But the Humean cannot 
admit relations or structures of entanglement on pain of destroying Humean supervenience. 
                                                
14 See Dorato and Esfeld (2010) for dispositionalism about the GRW ontologies. For dispositionalism about 
Bohmian mechanics, see Belot (2012, pp. 77-80) and Esfeld et al. (2014, sections 4-5). 
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Consequently, quantum physics does after all have a repercussion for Lewis’s Humean 
ontology: in the light of quantum physics, one can no longer maintain that the mosaic of local 
matters of particular fact consists in “local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties 
which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated” (Lewis 1986, p. x). There 
are no such qualities or intrinsic properties in quantum physics. Quantum entanglement rules 
out that such local, intrinsic properties could do any work as far as the features that are 
specific for quantum physics are concerned. Nonetheless, quantum entanglement 
notwithstanding, Lewis’s thesis of Humean supervenience can be literally true in quantum 
physics, as the primitive ontology theories show. The only adaptation that is necessary to 
obtain this result is to consider the mosaic of local matters of particular fact as being 
constituted by primitive stuff distributed in space-time. That stuff can be particles or flashes, 
with a particle or a flash being at a space-time point signifying that there is stuff located at the 
point instead of the point being empty, or that stuff can be gunk in the sense of a continuous 
matter density field. 
The option to maintain that the matter distributed in space-time and constituting the 
Humean supervenience basis consists in primitive stuff instead of local qualities (intrinsic 
properties) is not limited to quantum physics, but also available for classical mechanics. Also 
with respect to classical mechanics, one can subscribe to the view that mass and charge, like 
the quantum mechanical wave-function, are only variables that appear in the best system, that 
is, the system that achieves the best balance between being simple and being informative in 
describing the distribution of local matters of particular fact – such as particle positions – 
throughout the whole of space-time (see Hall unpublished §5.2). In other words, there are not 
mass and charge instantiated as intrinsic properties occurring at space-time points over and 
above particle positions signifying that a space-time point is occupied by stuff instead of 
being empty, as there is no wave-function instantiated as a relation or structure in space-time 
over and above the elements of whatever may be the primitive ontology of quantum physics. 
Adopting this stance removes the stock objections against Humeanism from quidditism and 
humility: if there were intrinsic properties instantiated at space-time points that exercize a 
causal role contingently, their essence would be a pure quality (a quiddity) to which we could 
moreover have no epistemic access (humility) (see Lewis 2009).15 Again, it is evident that the 
relationship between physics and metaphysics goes in both directions, with the physics here 
shaping Humean metaphysics in such a way that a central metaphysical objection against 
Humeanism no longer applies. 
In conclusion, this chapter has sought to show the following: 
a) how physics and metaphysics match in Newton’s philosophia naturalis;  
b) how even what seems to be a clear-cut case of metaphysical conclusions following 
directly from the formalism of a physical theory (presentism being ruled out by special 
                                                
15 There also is a sort of humility implied by the primitive ontology theories of quantum mechanics: in order 
for these theories to make the right empirical predictions and to rule out exploiting quantum non-locality 
for superluminal signalling, they have to limit the epistemic access that we can have to the elements of the 
primitive ontology in the sense that we cannot know the exact initial conditions (that is, the exact initial 
particle configuration in Bohmian mechanics, the exact initial matter density distribution in the GRW 
matter density ontology, or the exact initial configuration of flashes in the GRW flash ontology). However, 
this is not an ignorance of the types of properties or entities that there are in the actual world, but only an 
ignorance of initial conditions, albeit a principled one. 
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relativity) is called into question when one takes the whole of contemporary fundamental 
physics into account;  
c) how specifying what the very referent of the formalism of quantum mechanics is draws on 
metaphysical considerations;  
d) how the stance that one takes in the metaphysics of laws and modality shapes the options 
that are available for an ontology of quantum physics. 
In sum, far from separating physics from metaphysics, the physics of the 20th century calls for 
natural philosophy in the sense of an enterprise that regards physics and metaphysics as 
forming a seamless whole in the enquiry into the constitution of the world, at least as much as 
the physics of the 17th and the 18th century did. 
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